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Bit commitment protocols, whose security is based on the laws of quantum mechanics alone,
are generally held to be impossible on the basis of a concealment-bindingness tradeoff [1, 2]. A
strengthened and explicit impossibility proof has been given in Ref. [3] in the Heisenberg picture
and in a C∗-algebraic framework, considering all conceivable protocols in which both classical and
quantum information are exchanged. In the present paper we provide a new impossibility proof in
the Schro¨dinger picture, greatly simplifying the classification of protocols and strategies using the
mathematical formulation in terms of quantum combs [4], with each single-party strategy represented
by a conditional comb. We prove that assuming a stronger notion of concealment—worst-case over
the classical information histories—allows Alice’s cheat to pass also the worst-case Bob’s test. The
present approach allows us to restate the concealment-bindingness tradeoff in terms of the continuity
of dilations of probabilistic quantum combs with respect to the comb-discriminability distance.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment involves two mistrustful parties—
Alice and Bob—of which Alice submits to Bob a piece
of evidence that he will use to confirm a bit value that
she will later reveal, whereas Bob cannot determine the
bit value from the evidence alone. A good bit commit-
ment protocol should be simultaneously concealing and
binding, namely the evidence should be submitted to Bob
in such a way that he has (almost) no chance to identify
the committed bit value before Alice later decodes it for
him, whereas Alice has (almost) no way of changing the
value of the committed bit once she has submitted the
evidence. In the easiest example to illustrate bit com-
mitment, Alice writes the bit down on a piece of paper,
which is then locked in a safe and sent to Bob, whereas
Alice keeps the key. At a later time, she will unveil the
bit by handing over the key to Bob. However, Bob may
be able to open the safe in the meantime, and this scheme
is in principle insecure. Yet all bit commitment schemes
currently used rely on strongboxes and keys made of com-
putations that are (supposedly) hard to perform (see Ref.
[3] for a list of references), and cryptographers have long
known that bit commitment (like any other interesting
two-party cryptographic primitive) cannot be securely
implemented with classical information [5].
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Besides having immediate practical applications, bit
commitment is also a very powerful cryptographic primi-
tive. Conceived by Blum [6] as a building block for secure
coin tossing, it also allows to implement secure oblivious
transfer [7, 8, 9], which, in turn, is sufficient to establish
secure two-party computation [5, 10].
It has therefore been a long-time challenge for quan-
tum cryptographers to find unconditionally secure quan-
tum bit commitment protocols, in which—very much in
parallel to quantum key distribution [11, 12]—security is
guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics alone.
The first quantum bit commitment protocol appeared
in the famous Bennett and Brassard 1984 quantum cryp-
tography paper [11], in a version for implementing coin
tossing. However, they also proved that Alice can cheat
using EPR correlations, by which she can unveil either
bit at the opening stage by measuring in the appropri-
ate basis a particle entangled with the one encoding the
bit, whereas Bob has no way to detect the attack. Sub-
sequent proposals for bit commitment schemes tried to
evade this type of attack, e.g. in the protocol of Ref. [13]
which for a while was generally accepted to be uncondi-
tionally secure.
In 1996 Lo and Chau [1], and Mayers [2] realized that
all previously proposed bit commitment protocols were
vulnerable to a generalized version of the EPR attack
that renders the BB84 proposal insecure, a result that
they slightly extended to cover quantum bit commitment
protocols in general. Their basic argument is the fol-
lowing. At the end of the commitment phase, Bob will
hold one out of two quantum states ̺k as proof of Alice’s
commitment to the bit value k ∈ {0, 1}. Alice holds its
purification ψk, which she will later pass on to Bob to
2unveil. For the protocol to be concealing, the two states
̺k should be (almost) indistinguishable, ̺0 ≈ ̺1. But
Uhlmann’s theorem [14] then implies the existence of a
unitary transformation U that (nearly) rotates the pu-
rification of ̺0 into the purification of ̺1. Since U is
localized on the purifying system only, which is entirely
under Alice’s control, Lo-Chau-Mayers argue that Alice
can switch at will between the two states, and is not in
any way bound to her commitment. As a consequence,
any concealing bit commitment protocol is argued to be
necessarily non-binding (these results still hold true when
both parties are restricted by superselection rules [15]).
So while the proposed quantum bit commitment proto-
cols offer good practical security on the grounds that Al-
ice’s EPR attack is hard to perform with current tech-
nology, none of them is unconditionally secure.
Starting from 2000 the Lo-Chau-Mayers no-go theo-
rem [1, 2] has been continually challenged by Yuen and
others [16, 17, 18], arguing that the impossibility proof
of Ref. [1] does not exhaust all conceivable quantum
bit commitment protocols, whereas it is still unclear if
Mayer’s framework [2] is complete. Several protocols
have been proposed and claimed to circumvent the no-go
theorem [16]. These protocols seek to strengthen Bob’s
position with the help of ‘secret parameters’ or ‘anony-
mous states’, so that Alice lacks some information needed
to cheat successfully: while Uhlmann’s theorem would
still imply the existence of a unitary cheating transfor-
mation as described above, this transformation might be
unknown to Alice.
The above attempts to build up a secure quantum bit
commitment protocol have motivated the thorough anal-
ysis of Ref. [3], which provided a strengthened and ex-
plicit impossibility proof exhausting all conceivable pro-
tocols in which classical and quantum information is ex-
changed between two parties, including the possibility of
protocol aborts and resets. The proof [3] encompasses
protocols even with unbounded number of communica-
tion rounds (it is only required that the expected num-
ber of rounds is finite), and with quantum systems on
infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. However, the con-
siderable length of the proof in Ref. [3] makes it still
hard to follow (see e.g. comments in Ref. [17]), lacking
a synthetic intuition of the impossibility proof.
The debate can be only settled with an appropriate
formulation of the problem, which is sufficiently power-
ful to include all possible protocols in a single simple
mathematical object, thus leaving no shadow of doubt
on the completeness of the protocol classification. Once
the mathematical formulation of all protocols is settled,
then the impossibility statement becomes just a mathe-
matical theorem. In this paper we will first see that the
appropriate notion to describe all individual strategies in
a purely quantum protocol is the quantum comb. The
quantum comb generalizes the notion of quantum oper-
ation of Kraus [19], and has been originally introduced
in Ref. [4] to describe quantum circuit boards, where in-
puts and outputs are not just quantum states, but quan-
tum operations themselves. Since quantum combs are
in one-to-one correspondence with sequences of quantum
operations [4, 20], a quantum comb is suited to repre-
sent the sequence of moves performed by a party in a
multi-round quantum protocol. Indeed, the same mathe-
matical structure of quantum combs has been recognized
by Gutoski and Watrous in Ref. [21] as the appropriate
formulation of multi-round quantum games. In order to
treat protocols that involve both quantum and classical
communication, we will then extend this framework by
introducing the concept of conditional comb, which de-
scribes a computing network that is able to sequentially
process both quantum and classical information.
Examples of combs are represented diagrammatically
in Fig. 1. For a purely quantum comb, each line entering
or exiting a tooth of the comb represents a quantum sys-
tem. For a conditional comb, each line represents a hy-
brid quantum-classical system, accounting also for clas-
sical information exchanged at each step. In a two-party
protocol, a comb represents a single-party strategy, with
each tooth of the comb representing the move performed
by the party at some turn. Subsequent turns are repre-
sented by subsequent teeth, from left to right. The out-
put oft the multi-round protocol is given by two combs
interlaced as in Fig. 2—the upper Bob’s, the lower Al-
ice’s. The exchange of quantum-classical systems can be
mathematically described in a C∗-algebraic representa-
tion of a deterministic comb, or, equivalently, by treating
the conditional comb as a collection of (purely quantum)
probabilistic combs, each of them being labeled by a par-
ticular history of classical communication. In this paper,
we will choose the second point of view, which avoids
using the C∗-algebraic framework, with the need, how-
ever, of considering collections of probabilistic quantum
combs, accounting for the classical information coming
from measurements.
20 1 00 1
FIG. 1: Diagrammatic representation of quantum combs.
For a quantum comb each line entering or exiting a tooth
represents a quantum system, while for a conditional comb
it represents a hybrid quantum-classical system. A quantum
operation (the box on the left upper corner) is a special case
of quantum comb with a single tooth.
A protocol assigns the set of allowed strategies, i.e.
the set of allowed conditional combs, along with the per-
taining input-output structure regulating the exchange
of quantum and classical information. As already men-
tioned, a conditional comb is a collection of probabilistic
quantum combs, each of them representing the sequence
of single-party moves associated to a particular history of
classical communication. In a general protocol, some his-
tories will lead to a successful commitment, while some
other will possibly lead to an abort, in which the two
parties irrevocably give up, excluding any further com-
3munication (if the protocol is restarted, then the con-
catenation of the two sequences can be regarded as part
of a new longer protocol with possible resets). Accord-
ingly, we will consider histories from the beginning to the
end of the commitment (which can be either successful
or not), i.e excluding the opening. Each tooth of a comb
corresponds to a single turn of the protocol, and, in the
case of successful commitment, the last tooth represents
the last turn before the opening.
For histories that end in a successful commitment, in
the opening Alice will send to Bob a classical message
along with a set of ancillae prescribed by the protocol,
and Bob will perform a suitable joint measurement on
all quantum systems available to him, as in Fig. 2. The
combination of Bob’s comb (up to the opening) with the
final measurement at the opening is itself a special case
of quantum comb—the so-called quantum tester—whose
output is the committed bit value. In this framework,
Alice’s comb plays the role of a “state” encoding the bit
value, whereas Bob’s tester plays the role of a “POVM”
for binary discrimination. Such binary discrimination—
prescribed by the protocol at its end—should not be con-
fused with Bob’s attempts to discriminate Alice’s strate-
gies before the opening. We will see that the fact that
the protocol has many rounds actually can help Bob in
discriminating between different Alice’s strategies. Thus,
the probability of Bob cheating—which in a protocol with
a single Bob-Alice-Bob round would be represented by
the CB-norm distance between Alice’s channels—here
is replaced by the comb distance[22], which is typically
larger than the CB-norm, since Bob can exploit the mem-
ory structure of Alice’s strategy.
FIG. 2: A two-party protocol in which classical and quantum
information are exchanged assigns the set of allowed condi-
tional combs, along with the pertaining input-output struc-
ture. A conditional comb is a collection of quantum combs
labeled by histories of classical communication, each quantum
comb representing a specific sequence of single-party moves
for a particular classical history. Each tooth of a comb cor-
responds to a single turn of the protocol, the last one rep-
resenting the last turn in the commitment phase. For his-
tories ending in a successful commitment, at the opening
Bob performs a joint measurement on all systems available
to him. Combining Bob’s comb before the opening with this
final measurement yields a special case of quantum comb—
the so-called quantum tester—whose output is the committed
bit value. In this framework, Alice’s comb plays the role of
a “state” encoding the bit value, whereas Bob’s tester plays
the role of a “POVM” for binary discrimination. Such binary
discrimination—prescribed by the protocol at its end—should
not be confused with Bob’s attempts to discriminate Alice’s
strategies before the opening.
In the following we will consider the concealment-
bindingness tradeoff for any possible history of classi-
cal information exchanged within the protocol. This
will allow us to restate the tradeoff in terms of a math-
ematical theorem assessing the continuity of dilations
of probabilistic quantum combs in terms of the comb
discriminability-distance. The dilation theorem states
that any probabilistic comb can be dilated to a sequence
of single-Kraus quantum operations, upon introducing
some additional ancillae. As a consequence, the impossi-
bility proof will run essentially as follows. At the end of
the commitment phase, two possible Alice’s strategies for
the bit values 0 and 1, respectively, are (almost) indistin-
guishable to Bob, who lacks the quantum information en-
coded in Alice’s ancillae. Instead, at the opening, the two
dilated strategies of Alice corresponding to the two values
of the committed bit are (almost) perfectly discriminable.
As a consequence of indstinguishability up to the open-
ing phase, Alice can choose between the two strategies
by performing a unitary transformation on the ancilla in
the last tooth of her comb. Therefore, one has (almost)
perfect opening, and, at the same time, Alice can cheat
perfectly. The concealment-bindingness tradeoff is thus
reduced to the continuity of the dilation of probabilistic
combs in terms of their discriminability-distance. In the
present paper we will restrict to finite-dimensional proto-
cols, with finite-number of rounds. The last assumption
does not introduce any practical limitation, since, in the
real world one needs to put a bound anyway to the lapse
of time needed for the commitment. We will anyway dis-
cuss also protocols with unbounded number of rounds in
the concluding section.
Before starting the main sections of the paper, we com-
pare here the present approach with that of the previ-
ous impossibility proof in Ref. [27]. Ref. [27] treats
the strategies as the preparation of a quantum regis-
ter, and classical and quantum communications are de-
scribed in the Heisenberg picture in the unified frame-
work of C∗-algebras. In the present approach the C∗-
algebraic framework is avoided, by treating classical his-
tories as labels for sequences of quantum operations in
the Schro¨dinger picture, and strategies are identified
with conditional quantum combs, which provide a di-
rect mathematical formulation. At this level, the differ-
ences are only in the mathematical language, but two
approaches are substantially equivalent. There are, how-
ever, conceptual differences, in which the two approaches
sensibly differ. The most relevant difference is the no-
tion of security, which in the present treatment is taken
at the strongest level, i.e. worst-case over all classical
histories, whereas in Ref. [27] security was defined in av-
erage. The present security notion is cryptographically
the strongest, corresponding to a priceless commitment
bit. Another important difference between the present
approach and that of Ref. [27] is a more general impos-
sibility proof, in which one can restrict the set of possi-
ble Bob’s operations to a set closed under dilations. In
other words, we assume that Bob is able to keep pure
his quantum information and to perform arbitrary quan-
4tum operations on his ancillae, whereas his operations on
the quantum systems exchanged during the commitment
can be restricted by arbitrary constraints. This makes
the impossibility proof more general, including e.g. the
case of a Bob constrained by a checking Alice.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we re-
view the definition and the main features of a quantum
protocol for bit commitment, and define what a success-
ful bit commitment protocol would have to achieve. In
Section III we will briefly recall the prerequisites about
quantum combs, including the notion of quantum tester,
the discriminability-distance, the dilation of combs, and
the notion of conditional comb. The most important re-
sult of the section is the dilation theorem for quantum
combs, along with a continuity theorem in terms of the
discriminability-distance. In Section IV we present the
mathematical formulation of bit commitment in terms of
quantum combs, and state the impossibility proof for pro-
tocols with bounded and unbounded number of rounds
of communication. The analysis will be based solely on
the principles of quantum mechanics, including classical
physics, but not including relativistic constraints, which
are known to facilitate secure bit commitment [23, 24].
Section VI concludes the paper with some comments on
the main results.
II. WHAT IS A PROTOCOL
A protocol regulates the exchange of messages between
participants, defining what are the honest strategies that
they can adopt, so that at every stage it is clear what type
of message is expected from the participants, although, of
course, their content is not fixed. The expected message
types can be either classical or quantum or a combination
thereof. The number of classical states and the dimension
of the Hilbert spaces at a given step can depend on the
previously generated classical information.
A. Phases of the Protocol
In any bit commitment protocol, we can distinguish
two main phases. The first is the commitment phase,
in which Alice and Bob exchange classical and quantum
messages in order to commit the bit. Eventually, this
phase can end either with a successful commitment, or
with an abort, in which the two parties irrevocably give
up the purpose of committing the bit (of course, in a well-
designed protocol, if both parties are honest the proba-
bility of abort should be vanishingly small). If no abort
took place, the bit value is considered to be committed
to Bob but, supposedly, concealed from him. Since bit
commitment is a two-party protocol and trusted third
parties are not allowed, the starting state necessarily has
to be originated by one of the two parties (see also Fig.
3). Moreover, since we can always include in the protocol
null steps (in which no information, classical or quantum,
FIG. 3: The bit commitment protocol is two-party only, and
trusted third parties are not allowed. Here in figure rounded
portions represent examples of trusted third parties, e.g. the
left one could be a trusted joint state, and the right one a
trusted joint measurement. Another example of third party
could be a third comb interlaced with Alice’s and Bob’s.
is exchanged), without loss of generality, we can restrict
our attention to protocols that are started by Bob.
The second phase is the opening phase. In the case
of abort during the commitment, this is just a null step,
whereas, in the case of successful commitment, at the
opening Alice will send to Bob some classical or quantum
information in order to to reveal the bit value. Taking
both Alice’s message and his own (classical and quan-
tum) records, Bob will then perform a suitable verifica-
tion measurement. His measurement will result in either
a successful readout of the committed bit, or in a fail-
ure, e.g. due to the detection of an attempted cheat.
Again, in a well-designed protocol the probability of fail-
ure should be vanishingly small.
B. Conditions on Successful Protocols
In the following we will denote by a0 and a1 two hon-
est strategies corresponding to the two bit values 0 and
1, respectively. We call a protocol ε-concealing if, condi-
tionally on any history of classical communication, Bob
cannot distinguish between the strategies a0 and a1 (up
to an error ε) before Alice opens the commitment. In gen-
eral, of course, the probability of a given history of clas-
sical communication depends on whether Alice chooses
a0 or a1. Since this dependence can be exploited by Bob
to infer the bit value, we must require that, no matter
what strategy b Bob uses, the conditional probability of
a0 given history s never differs from the probability of a1
given history s by more than ε. Note that this require-
ment must by satisfied even by histories that end up in
an abort, otherwise, by the sole fact that the protocol
aborted Bob could reliably infer the value of the bit.
We say that an Alice’s strategy a♯ is δ-close to a if,
conditionally on any history of classical communication,
Bob cannot distinguish a from a♯ (up to an error δ) at
any time, including the opening phase. Given two honest
strategies a0 and a1, a δ-cheating is a pair of strategies
a♯0 and a
♯
1, with the properties that i) a
♯
i is δ-close to ai
for i = 0, 1 and ii) Alice can turn a♯0 into a
♯
1 with a local
operation on her ancillae after the end of the commitment
5phase. In other words, the strategies a♯0 and a
♯
1 are the
same throughout the commitment phase, and differ only
by a local operation carried out before the opening. If no
δ-cheating strategy exists for Alice, we call the protocol
δ-binding.
III. PREREQUISITES ON QUANTUM COMBS
Here we briefly summarize the formalism of quantum
combs and few related results. In addition, this section
contains the core result of this paper, namely the conti-
nuity theorem for the dilation of probabilistic quantum
combs in terms of their discriminability-distance.
A. Choi-Jamio lkowski operators and link product
A quantum operation (trace non-increasing CP-map)
C from states on Hi to states on Hj is described by its
Choi-Jamio lkowski operator
C = (C ⊗Ii)(|Ii〉〉〈〈Ii|) ∈ Lin (Hj ⊗Hi) , (1)
where Ii is the identity map on Hi, and |Ii〉〉 ∈ H⊗2i is
the maximally entangled vector |Ii〉〉 =
∑
n |n〉|n〉, {|n〉}
orthonormal basis for Hi. By the Choi’s theorem, the
map C is CP if and only if the Choi-Jamio lkowski oper-
ator is positive (semidefinite). In general, we will often
exploit the one-to-one correspondence between bipartite
states in |F 〉〉 ∈ Hj ⊗Hi and operators F from Hi to Hj
given by
|F 〉〉 = (F ⊗ Ii)|Ii〉〉, (2)
and the useful relation
(F ⊗ Ii)|Ii〉〉 = (Ij ⊗ F τ )|Ij〉〉, (3)
F τ denoting the transposed of F with respect to the or-
thonormal basis {|n〉}. If C is a quantum operation from
Hi to Hj and D is a quantum operation from Hj to Hk,
the Choi-Jamio lkowski operator of the quantum opera-
tion D C , from Hi to Hk, resulting from the connection
of C and D is given by the link product [4]
D ∗ C := Trj [(D ⊗ Ii)(Ik ⊗ Cτj )], (4)
Trj and τj denoting partial trace and partial transpose
on Hj , respectively. A quantum operation C is trace-
preserving (i.e. it is a channel) if and only if it satisfies
the normalization condition
Ij ∗ C ≡ Trj [C] = Ii. (5)
Viewing quantum states as a special kind of channels
(with one-dimensional input space), Eq. (4) yields
C (ρ) = C ∗ ρ = Tri[C(Ij ⊗ ρτ )]. (6)
B. Quantum combs
A quantum comb describes a sequential network of N
quantum operations with memory (Ck)
N−1
k=0 , with N −
1 open slots in which variable quantum operations can
be inserted, as in Fig. 4. The comb is in one-to-one
C0 C1 CN−2 CN−1
FIG. 4: N-comb: sequential network of N quantum opera-
tions with memory. The network contains input and output
systems (free wires in the diagram), as well as internal mem-
ories (wires connecting the boxes).
correspondence with the the Choi-Jamio lkowski operator
R of the network, which can be computed as the link
product of the Choi-Jamio lkowski operators (Ck)
N−1
k=0 :
R := CN−1 ∗ · · · ∗ C0. (7)
Labelling the input (output) spaces of Ck as
H2k (H2k+1), we have that R is a non-negative
operator on K :=⊗2N−1j=0 Hj .
For networks of channels the operator R has to satisfy
the recursive normalization condition [4, 21]
Tr2k−1[R
(k)] = I2k−2 ⊗ R(k−1) k = 1, . . . , N (8)
where R(N) := R, R(k) ∈ Lin
(⊗2k−1
j=0 Hj
)
, and R(0) = 1.
Moreover, one has the characterization [4, 20]
Theorem 1 Any positive operator R satisfying Eq. (8)
is the Choi-Jamio lkowski operator of a sequential net-
work of N channels. Any positive operator R′ such that
R′ ≤ R is the Choi-Jamio lkowski operator of a sequential
network of N quantum operations.
We call a quantum comb R satisfying Eq. (8) determin-
istic, and a comb R′ ≤ R probabilistic.
C. Dilation of quantum combs
By Stinespring-Kraus-Ozawa theorem[19, 25, 26], any
quantum operation C from states on Hi to Hj can be
dilated to an isometric map followed by a post-selection
on an ancilla
C (ρ) = TrA[(I ⊗ PA)V ρV †]
= TrA[KρK
†] K = (I ⊗ PA)V,
(9)
with V isometry from Hi to Hj⊗HA, and PA orthogonal
projector on a subspace of the ancilla space HA.
6We refer to the single-Kraus map
C˜ (ρ) := KρK† (10)
as to a dilation of the quantum operation C . In terms of
Choi-Jamio lkowski operators, one has
C = TrA[C˜] ∈ Lin (Hj ⊗Hi) , (11)
where C˜ = |K〉〉〈〈K| is the Choi-Jamio lkowski operator
of the dilation. A (minimal) dilation of the quantum
operation C has ancilla space HA ≃ Supp(C) ⊆ Hj ⊗
Hi := Hij , and Choi-Jamio lkowski operator
C˜ = |C 12 〉〉〈〈C 12 | ∈ Lin (Hij ⊗HA) . (12)
In particular, when the quantum operation is a quantum
channel also its dilation is a channel—C˜ (ρ) = V ρV †, V
isometry—with the Choi-Jamio lkowski operator satisfy-
ing the normalization condition TrA,j [C˜] = Ii.
Since a quantum comb R ∈ Lin (K) with K =⊗2N−1
j=0 Hj represents a sequential network of quantum
operations, one can always obtain a dilation of the comb
by dilating each quantum operation in the network. A
useful dilation of R is given by
R˜ = |R 12 〉〉〈〈R 12 | ∈ Lin (K ⊗HA) , (13)
where HA ≃ Supp(R) ⊆ K. The dilation R˜ has the fol-
lowing interpretation: R˜ is a quantum comb acting on the
Hilbert spaces
(
H˜j
)2N−1
j=0
, where H˜2N−1 := H2N−1⊗HA,
and H˜k = Hk for k < 2N − 1. Therefore, by Theorem 1
it represents a sequence of N quantum operations with
memory (C˜k)
N−1
k=0 . Tracing out the ancilla space HA in
the output H˜2N−1 = H2N−1 ⊗ HA of the last quantum
operation C˜N−1, one then obtains back the original net-
work
R = TrA
[
R˜
]
. (14)
Note that only the ancilla space HA in the output of the
last quantum operation appears in the dilation R˜.
For quantum states it is known that the purification is
unique up to partial isometries on the ancilla spaces. For
quantum combs one has the straightforward extension:
Proposition 1 Let R ∈ Lin (K), K = ⊗2N−1j=0 Hj be
a quantum comb. Let R˜ ∈ Lin (K ⊗HA) and R˜′ ∈
Lin (K ⊗HA′) be two dilations of R, i.e. R˜ and R˜′ are
both non-negative rank-one operators such that
TrA
[
R˜
]
= TrA′
[
R˜′
]
. (15)
Then there exists a partial isometry W from HA to HA′
such that
R˜′ = (I ⊗W )R˜(I ⊗W †),
R˜ = (I ⊗W †)R˜′(I ⊗W ),
(16)
I denoting the identity on K.
For the application to bit commitment it is crucial to
note that all dilations of a comb can be obtained by just
applying a partial isometry W on the last output system.
An obvious consequence of the above fact is:
Corollary 1 Let R ∈ Lin (K) ,K = ⊗2N−1j=0 Hj be
a quantum comb. If R˜ ∈ Lin (K ⊗HA) and R˜′ ∈
Lin (K ⊗HA′) are two dilations of R, then there exist two
quantum channels E from states on HA to states on HA′
and F from states on HA′ to states on HA such that
R˜′ = (I ⊗ E ) (R˜) = E ∗ R˜
R˜ = (I ⊗F ) (R˜′) = F ∗ R˜′,
(17)
I denoting the identity map on K, and E and F being
the Choi-Jamio lkowski operators of the channels E and
F , respectively.
This means that one can switch from one dilation to an-
other just by performing some physical transformation
on the ancilla in output of the last quantum operation of
the comb. As we will see in the following, in a bit com-
mitment protocol this implies that Alice can delay her
choice of the bit to the last moment before the opening.
D. Quantum testers
A tester represents a quantum network starting with
a state preparation and finishing with a measurement.
When such a network is connected to a network of N
quantum operations as in Fig. 5, the output is a mea-
surement outcome i with probability pi. In a bit com-
mitment protocol, a dishonest Bob will perform a tester
to distinguish Alice’s strategies before the opening.
✬
✫
✩
✪ρ0 D1 DN−1
C0 CN−1
Pi
FIG. 5: Testing a network of N quantum operations (Ck)
N−1
k=0
.
The tester consists in the preparation of an input state ρ0,
followed by quantum operations {D1, . . . ,DN−1}, and a final
measurement {Pi}.
Mathematically, the tester is the collection of Choi-
Jamio lkowski operators {Ti} given by
Ti := Pi ∗DN−1 ∗ · · · ∗D1 ∗ ρ0, (18)
where (Dk)
N−1
k=1 are the Choi-Jamio lkowski operators of
the quantum operations (Dk)
N−1
k=1 in Fig. 5. If the sum
over all outcomes T =
∑
i Ti is a deterministic comb, we
call the tester normalized.
7When the tester is connected to a quantum network
R, the probability of the outcome i is
pi = Ti ∗R = Tr [T τi R] , (19)
which is nothing but the Born rule, for quantum net-
works rather than states. Notice that one can include
the transpose in the definition of the tester, thus getting
the familiar form of the Born rule pi = Tr[TiR]. How-
ever, here we preferred to write probabilities in terms of
the combs R and Ti of the measured and measuring net-
works, respectively, thus making explicit that the Born
rule is nothing but a particular case of link product, the
transpose appearing as the signature of the linking of two
networks.
For a deterministic comb R and a normalized tester
{Ti} one has the normalization of the total probability:∑
i
pi =
∑
i
Tr[T τi R] = 1. (20)
In general, if one considers sub-normalized testers, one
has ∑
i
pi =
∑
i
Tr[T τi R] = p ≤ 1. (21)
In the following we will call T =
∑
i Ti tester operator.
Proposition 2 (Decomposition of testers [22]) Let
T ∈ Lin (K) ,K = ⊗2N−1j=0 Hj be the tester operator of
the quantum tester {Ti}. Let HB be the ancilla space
HB ≃ Supp (T ) ⊆ K, and T˜ be the dilation given by
T˜ = |T 12 〉〉〈〈T 12 | ∈ Lin (H⊗HB) . (22)
Then, one has the identity
T˜ ∗R = [T τ ] 12 R [T τ ] 12 . (23)
Moreover, the probabilities of outcomes pi = Ti ∗ R are
given by
pi = Pi ∗ T˜ ∗R, (24)
where {Pi} is the POVM on HB defined by
Pi = T
− 12 Ti T
− 12 , (25)
T−1/2 being the inverse of T 1/2 on its support.
Proof. Checking Eq. (23) is immediate using Eq. (3)
T˜ ∗R = TrH[(Rτ ⊗ IB)|T 12 〉〉〈〈T 12 |]
= [T τ ]
1
2 R [T τ ]
1
2 .
(26)
Regarding Eq. (24), one has pi = Ti ∗ R = Tr[T τi R] =
Tr[[T τ ]
1
2 P τi [T
τ ]
1
2 R] = Tr[P τi (T˜ ∗R)] = Pi ∗ T˜ ∗R. 
The interpretation of the above result is the following
realization scheme for the tester {Ti}:
• realize the quantum network T˜ and connect it with
the measured network R
• conditionally on the given history of classical in-
formation corresponding to T˜ , perform the POVM
{Pi} on the ancilla state ρ = T˜ ∗R.
E. Discriminability of combs
Proposition 2 reduces any measurement on quan-
tum network R to a measurement on a suitable (sub-
normalized) state ρ = T˜ ∗ R, which is obtained by con-
necting the input comb R with a suitable comb T˜ cor-
responding to the dilation of Eq. (22). In particular, it
reduces the discrimination of two networks R0 and R1 to
the discrimination of two output states
ρ
(i)
T = T˜ ∗Ri = [T τ ]
1
2 Ri [T
τ ]
1
2 i = 0, 1. (27)
This allows for the definition of an operational distance
between networks [22], whose meaning is directly related
to statistical discriminability
||R1 −R0||op := sup
T
||ρ(1)T − ρ(0)T ||1
= sup
T
||T˜ ∗ (R1 −R0)||1
= sup
T
∣∣∣∣∣∣[T τ ] 12 (R1 −R0) [T τ ] 12 ∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
,
(28)
where twe supremum is taken over the set of all tester
operators T =
∑
i Ti, and ||A||1 = Tr|A|. Remarkably,
the above norm can be strictly greater than the cb-norm
of the difference R1−R0 of the two multipartite channels
[22], since a sequential scheme such as that in Fig. 5 can
achieve a strictly better discrimination than a parallel
scheme where a multipartite entangled state is fed in the
unknown channel.
When the tester T and the combs Ri are probabilistic
(namely correspond to networks of quantum operations)
the states ρ
(i)
T = T˜ ∗Ri are generally sub-normalized, i.e.
Tr[ρ
(i)
T ] ≤ 1. In this case, the sole fact that the sequences
of quantum operations represented by T˜ and Ri took
place helps in discriminating between R0 and R1. To be
concrete, consider the scenario in which R0 and R1 have
flat prior probabilities π0 = π1 = 1/2. The probability
that the sequence of operations represented by T˜ and Ri
takes place is then given by p(T˜ , Ri) = Tr[ρ
(i)
T ]/2. Since
this probability depends on i, upon knowing that the
sequence of quantum operations T˜ took place the initial
flat prior must be updated to
π′i = p(Ri|T˜ ) =
p(T˜ , Ri)
p(T˜ )
=
Tr[ρ
(i)
T ]
Tr[ρ
(0)
T + ρ
(1)
T ]
. (29)
The discrimination is now between the two conditional
states ρ¯
(i)
T :=
ρ
(i)
T
Tr[ρ
(i)
T ]
with prior probability π′i, i = 0, 1.
8Therefore, the maximum success probability is given by
psucc =
1
2
(
1 +
∥∥∥π′0ρ¯(0)T − π′1ρ¯(1)T ∥∥∥
1
)
=
1
2
1 +
∥∥∥ρ(0)T − ρ(1)T ∥∥∥
1
Tr[ρ
(0)
T + ρ
(1)
T ]
 . (30)
Accordingly, we introduce the comb discriminability “dis-
tance”
d(R1, R0) := sup
T
′
∥∥∥ρ(1)T − ρ(0)T ∥∥∥
1
Tr
[
ρ
(1)
T + ρ
(0)
T
]
= sup
T
′
∥∥∥T˜ ∗ (R1 −R0)∥∥∥
1
Tr[T˜ ∗ (R1 +R0)]
= sup
T
′
∥∥∥[T τ ] 12 (R1 −R0) [T τ ] 12∥∥∥
1
Tr[T τ(R1 +R0)]
,
(31)
where sup′ (and consistently inf ′) denotes the supremum
(infimum) restricted to the tester operators T such that
Tr[T τ(R0 + R1)] > 0. Here and in the following, we use
the word ”distance” informally, although for probabilistic
combs the function d is just a semi-metric, namely the
triangular inequality does not hold (e.g. consider the
states ρ = 1/2(|0〉〈0|), σ = 1/2(|1〉〈1|), and τ = I/2, for
which d(ρ, σ) > d(ρ, τ) + d(τ, σ)).
1. Discriminability with a restricted set of testers
The comb distance quantifies the performances of the
best scheme among all possible sequential schemes one
can use to discriminate between two quantum networks.
However, in a bit commitment protocol the set of schemes
that Bob can actually use for discrimination may be lim-
ited by several factors. For example, Alice could perform
random checks during the commitment phase in order to
force Bob to use a quantum network that is close to the
one prescribed by the honest strategy. We will therefore
define optimal discrimination between R0 and R1 rela-
tively to a restricted set T of tester operators that can
actually occur in the protocol, thus introducing the dis-
criminability “distance”
d(R1, R0)|T := sup
T∈T
′
∥∥∥ρ(1)T − ρ(0)T ∥∥∥
1
Tr
[
ρ
(1)
T + ρ
(0)
T
]
= sup
T∈T
′
∥∥∥[T τ ] 12 (R1 −R0) [T τ ] 12∥∥∥
1
Tr[T τ (R1 +R0)]
.
(32)
The restriction of possible testers to a general set implies
that the distance defined in Eq. (32) does not satisfy the
property d(x, y) = 0⇒ x = y.
Lemma 1 The discriminability distance in Eq. (32) is
monotone under the application of a channel on the ouput
spaces, namely
d((C ⊗Iin)R1, (C ⊗Iin)R0)|T ≤ d(R1, R0)|T . (33)
Proof. Use monotonicity of trace-distance and the fact
that the map C is trace-preserving.
F. Continuity of dilation
We now prove that if two quantum combs R0 and R1
are close to each other then there exist two dilations R˜0
and R˜1 that are close with respect to the discriminabil-
ity distance. Such continuity theorem replaces the Stine-
spring’s continuity theorem [27] used in the previous (C∗-
algebraic) impossibility proof of Ref. [3].
Lemma 2 (Continuity of dilation) Let R0, R1 ∈
Lin (K) be two quantum combs, R˜i = |R
1
2
i 〉〉〈〈R
1
2
i | ∈
Lin (K ⊗HA) ,HA ≃ K be two dilations, and T ⊆ Lin (K)
be an arbitrary set of tester operators T . The following
bound holds
inf
P
d
(
R˜1, (I ⊗ P)(R˜0)
)∣∣∣
T⊗I
≤
√
2 d(R0, R1)|T (34)
where T ⊗ I = {T ⊗ I|T ∈ T} and the infimum is
taken over the set of random unitary channels P(ρ) =∑
k pk UkρU
†
k acting on the ancilla HA.
Proof. If we define
∆˜Uk :=
R˜1 − (I ⊗ Uk)R˜0(I ⊗ U †k)
Tr[(R˜0 + R˜1) ∗ T ]
, (35)
we have
inf
P
d
(
R˜1, (I ⊗ P)(R˜0)
)∣∣∣
T⊗I
= inf
P
sup
T∈T
′
∥∥∥∥∥∑
k
pkT˜ ∗ ∆˜Uk
∥∥∥∥∥
1
.
(36)
The triangle inequality for the trace-norm yields∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
pkT˜ ∗ ∆˜Uk
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
≤
∑
k
pk
∣∣∣∣∣∣T˜ ∗ ∆˜Uk ∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
. (37)
Moreover, exploiting Eq. (23) we can write∥∥∥T˜ ∗ ∆˜Uk∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥Ψ(1)T,I −Ψ(0)T,Uk∥∥∥1 , (38)
where Ψ
(0)
T,I and Ψ
(1)
T,Uk
are defined by
Ψ
(i)
T,C := |Ψ(i)T,C〉〉〈〈Ψ(i)T,C |
|Ψ(i)T,C〉〉 :=
([T τ ]
1
2 ⊗ C)|R
1
2
i 〉〉√
Tr[(R0 +R1)T τ ]
,
(39)
9for C ∈ Lin (HA) any contraction. Using the bound
|||ψ〉〈ψ| − |ϕ〉〈ϕ|||21 = (||ψ||2 + ||ϕ||2)2 − 4|〈ψ|ϕ〉|2
≤(||ψ||+ ||ϕ||)2(||ψ||2 + ||ϕ||2 − 2|〈ψ|ϕ〉|), (40)
which for ‖ψ‖2 + ‖ϕ‖2 = 1 becomes
|||ψ〉〈ψ| − |ϕ〉〈ϕ|||21 ≤ 2(1− 2|〈ψ|ϕ〉|), (41)
we obtain
||T˜ ∗ ∆˜Uk ||1 ≤
√
2
(
1− 2|〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,Uk〉〉|
) 1
2
. (42)
Then, by Jensen’s inequality we have the following bound
√
2 inf
P
sup
T∈T
′
∑
k
pk
(
1− 2|〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,Uk〉〉|
) 1
2 ≤
√
2 inf
P
sup
T∈T
′
(
1− 2
∑
k
pk
∣∣∣〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,Uk〉〉∣∣∣
) 1
2
≤
√
2 inf
P
sup
T∈T
′
(
1− 2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
pk〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,Uk〉〉
∣∣∣∣∣
) 1
2
=
√
2 inf
P
sup
T∈T
′
(
1− 2
∣∣∣〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,C〉〉∣∣∣) 12 ≤
√
2 inf
P
sup
T∈T
′
(
1− 2Re〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,C〉〉
) 1
2
,
(43)
where C is the contraction C =
∑
k pkUk. Let us define
by C the compact convex set of all contractions C =∑
k pkUk, and define the following function on C× T
f(C, T ) := Re〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,C〉〉, (44)
In Appendix A we use Sion’s minimax theorem of Ref.
[28] to prove the identity
inf
T∈T
′ sup
C∈C
f(C, T ) = sup
C∈C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T ). (45)
The chain of inequalities proved until now gives
inf
P
d
(
R˜1, (I ⊗ P)(R˜0)
)∣∣∣
T
≤
√
2(1 − 2 sup
C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T ))
1
2
=
√
2
(
1− 2 inf
T∈T
′ sup
C
f(C, T )
) 1
2
= (46)
≤
√
2
(
1− 2 inf
T∈T
′ sup
U
f(U, T )
) 1
2
, (47)
where we substituted the supremum over contractions
C =
∑
k pkUk with the supremum over unitaries U , since
the function f(T,C) is linear in C. Moreover, we have
sup
U
f(T, U) = sup
U
Re〈〈Ψ(0)T,I |I ⊗ U |Ψ(1)T,I〉〉
=sup
U
〈〈Ψ(0)T,I |I ⊗ U |Ψ(1)T,I〉〉 =
F
(
ρ
(1)
T , ρ
(0)
T
)
Tr[ρ
(1)
T + ρ
(0)
T ]
,
(48)
where ρ
(i)
T i = 0, 1 denote the unnormalized states
ρ
(i)
T := [T
τ ]
1
2 Ri [T
τ ]
1
2 and F (ρ, σ) = supU Tr[ρ
1
2Uσ
1
2 ]
is the Uhlmann fidelity. Finally, we can use the Bures-
Alberti-Uhlmann bound
Tr[ρ+ σ]− 2F (ρ, σ) ≤ ‖ρ− σ‖1 (49)
to obtain
inf
P
d
(
R˜1, (I ⊗ P)(R˜0)
)∣∣∣
T
≤ (50)
√
2sup
T∈T
′
1− 2 F
(
ρ
(1)
T , ρ
(0)
T
)
Tr
[
ρ
(0)
T + ρ
(1)
T
]

1
2
≤ sup
T∈T
′
√√√√√ 2||ρ(1)T − ρ(0)T ||1
Tr
[
ρ
(0)
T + ρ
(1)
T
] = √2 d(R1, R0)|T. (51)

G. Conditional quantum combs
A general two party protocol entails the exchange
of both quantum systems and of classical information,
which is in principle openly known. Therefore, the strat-
egy of a party will result in a sequence of quantum op-
erations C
s2k−2
i2k−1
, k = 1, 2, . . . , N , as in Fig. 6. Here the
index i2k−1 denotes the outcome of the quantum opera-
tion, and the string sl represents the full history of clas-
sical information exchanged before the occurrence of the
operation, namely sl = i0i1 . . . il, with i2k−2 representing
the input classical information at step k. For example, if
C
s0
i1
C
s2
i3
C
s2N−2
i2N−1
Hs0 Hs1Hs2 Hs3Hs2N−2 Hs2N−1
FIG. 6: Sequence of quantum operations depending on pre-
viously exchanged classical information. Here i2k−1 is the
outcome of the k-th quantum operation, and sl = i0i1 . . . il
is the history of classical information available at step l. The
collection of all sequences corresponding to all possible clas-
sical histories is the conditional comb.
the comb in Fig. 6 represents Alice’s strategy in a two-
party protocol with Alice’s and Bob’s combs interlaced
as in Fig. 2, it describes the following situation: Alice
receives from Bob the classical information i0 ≡ s0 along
with a quantum system with Hilbert space Hs0 . Then
she performs the instrument I s0 = {C s0j } obtaining the
outcome j = i1. After that she sends to Bob the out-
come along with a quantum system with Hilbert space
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Hs1 with s1 = i0i1. The normalization of the instrument
is∑
i1
TrHs1 [C
s0
i1
(ρ)] = Tr[ρ], ∀s0, ∀ρ ∈ Lin (Hs0) , (52)
which, in terms of Choi-Jamio lkowski operators reads∑
i1
TrHs1 [C
s0
i1
] = Is0 ∀s0. (53)
At the next step Alice receives from Bob the classi-
cal information i2 along with a quantum system with
Hilbert space Hs2 , which depends on s2 = i0i1i2. Then
she performs the instrument I s2 = {C s2j } obtaining
the outcome j = i3, and so on. By linking the Choi-
Jamio lkowski operators of all quantum operations, one
obtains a family of probabilistic combs {Rs2N−1} satisfy-
ing the normalization conditions∑
i2k−1
TrHs2k−1 [R
(k)
s2k−2i2k−1
] = Is2k−2 ⊗R(k−1)s2k−3 , (54)
where R
(N)
s2N−1 := Rs2N−1 , R
(k)
s2k−1 ∈ Lin
(⊗2k−1
j=0 Hsj
)
,
and R(0) = 1. Eq. (54) is the mathematical represen-
tation of the most general strategy in an N -round proto-
col with exchange of classical and quantum information,
generalizing the game theoretical framework introduced
by Gutoski and Watrous [21] for protocols involving only
exchange of quantum systems. We will call the collection
of probabilistic quantum combs satisfying Eq. (54) a con-
ditional comb. This nomenclature reflects the fact that
the most general way of conditioning a quantum comb
needs to use at each step the information coming from
all previous steps.
Eq. (54) sets a one-to-one correspondence between
single-party strategies in a protocol and conditional
combs: indeed, a collection of positive operators satis-
fying Eq. (54) can always be realized by a sequence of
quantum instruments conditioned by classical informa-
tion, as in Fig. (6). This fact is proved in the following
proposition.
Theorem 2 Any conditional comb is the collection of
Choi-Jamio lkowski operators of a sequential network of
N conditional instruments as in Fig. 6.
Proof. Suppose that a collection of operators {Rs2N−1}
labeled by classical strings s2N−1 = i0i1 . . . i2N−1 satis-
fies conditions Eq. (54). Then, we can define the operator
R :=
∑
s2N−1
Rs2N−1 ⊗ |s2N−1〉〈s2N−1|
⊗ |s2N−2〉〈s2N−2| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |s0〉〈s0|.
(55)
Here, R acts on the tensor product K := ⊗2N−1j=0 Hj ,
where the j-th space is Hj :=
(⊕
sj
Hsj ⊗ |sj〉
)
. With
this definition, R is a deterministic comb, i.e. an oper-
ator satisfying Eq. (8). Therefore, by Proposition 1 R
can be realized with a network of N channels (Ck)
N−1
k=0
as in Fig. 4. Now, if we apply the von Neumann-
Lu¨ders measurements {Is2k ⊗ |s2k〉〈s2k|} on the input
space H2k before channel Ck, followed by {Is2k+1 ⊗
|s2k+1〉〈s2k+1|} on the output space H2k+1 after chan-
nel Ck, we obtain the conditional quantum operations
{C s2ki2k+1}. Denoting by Cs2ki2k+1 the Choi-Jamio lkowski op-
erator of the quantum operation C s2ki2k+1 we then have
Rs2N−1 = C
s2N−2
i2N−1
∗ Cs2N−4i2N−3 ∗ · · · ∗ Cs0i1 , i.e. Rs2N−1 is the
Choi-Jamio lkowski operator of the sequence of quantum
operations (C s2ki2k+1 )
N−1
k=0 , as in Fig. 6. 
In the following we will consider the dilation of a condi-
tional comb {Rs2N−1} defined as the collection {R˜s2N−1}
of dilations R˜s2N−1 ∈ Lin
([⊗2N−1
j=0 Hsj
]
⊗HA,s2N−1
)
of
each comb Rs2N−1 ∈ Lin
(⊗2N−1
j=0 Hsj
)
, where HA,s2N−1
is an ancillary space depending on history. The follow-
ing theorem guarantees that the dilation of a conditional
comb is still a conditional comb.
Theorem 3 For any conditional comb {Rs2N−1} the di-
lation {R˜s2N−1} defined by R˜s2N−1 := |R
1
2
s2N−1〉〉〈〈R
1
2
s2N−1 |
is a conditional comb.
Proof. Define H′s2N−1 := Hs2N−1 ⊗ HA,s2N−1 and
H′sl = Hsl for l < 2N − 1. Then, the opera-
tors {R˜s2N−1} form a conditional comb with R˜s2N−1 ∈
Lin
(⊗2N−1
j=0 H′sj
)
. 
The dilation of a conditional comb describes as a se-
quence of single-Kraus quantum operations, each of them
depending on the previously exchanged classical infor-
mation. Loosely speaking, this theorem means that the
“quantum part” of any strategy can be purified until the
end of the protocol, still resulting in a valid strategy.
IV. COMB FORMULATION OF THE
QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT
A (generally multiparty) protocol establishes which are
the honest single-party strategies. A strategy is a choice
of processing of classical/quantum information at each
step, and specifies which quantum instrument a party
will perform jointly on his ancillae and on the received
quantum systems, conditionally on the available classical
information. The honest strategies of the protocol fix
the communication interface among parties, consisting of
the complete specification of which classical and quantum
systems are exchanged at each step. A cheating strategy
can be any strategy that conforms to the communication
interface.
A definition of security of a protocol generally depends
on the specific goals of the involved parties. For the quan-
tum bit commitment a protocol is defined as perfectly
secure if the following conditions are satisfied:
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concealment: for all Alice’s honest strategies Bob
cannot read the committed bit before the opening;
bindingness: for all honest Bob’s strategies Alice
cannot change the value of the committed bit with-
out being detected.
Note the asymmetry between the security condition for
the two parties: on the one hand, security for Alice means
that Bob has no chance at all to read the bit, while, one
the other hand, security for Bob means that if Alice tries
to cheat, she will be surely detected. Perfect security is
relaxed to the case of ε-concealment and δ-bindingness,
where the probability for Bob to read the committed bit
is bounded by ε, and the probability for Alice to change
the bit value is bounded by δ.
In the following subsections we will formulate strate-
gies in terms of quantum combs, and evaluate the prob-
abilities of successfully cheating for both parties.
A. Alice’s and Bob’s strategies
As already noticed, there is no loss of generality in con-
sidering bit commitment protocols started by Bob. With
the letter k = 1, . . . , N we will denote the k-th Bob’s
and Alice’s step. Thus sl = i0i1 . . . il will represent the
history of classical information with i2k−1 denoting the
outcome of Bob’s quantum operation at step k (which
is the same as Alice’s classical input at Alice’s step k)
and i2k−2 for k > 1 represents Bob’s input classical in-
formation (which is Alice’s outcome at step k − 1). At
the beginning of the protocol there is no classical and
quantum information, whence s0 = i0 is the null string
andH0 = C. At the end of the commitment stage we can
assume without loss of generality that Alice performs the
last move (for a protocol where the last move is Bob’s,
we can always add a null move, in which no classical and
quantum systems are sent).
We now analyze the case in which the total number of
steps in the protocol is bounded uniformly over all pos-
sible histories, and denote by N the maximum number
of steps. Moreover, since we can always add null moves,
we consider without loss of generality protocols where
the number of steps is N independently of the history.
Therefore the classical history labeling the sequence of
quantum operations will be s2N for Alice, and s2N−1 for
Bob. Finally, by adding null steps we can decide without
loss of generality that in the last move before the open-
ing Alice performs just a local operation on her ancillae,
i.e. she does not send to Bob any classical or quan-
tum information. Accordingly, i2N is the null string, and
Hs2N = C for any history s2N . Since both i0 and i2N are
null strings, we have s2N ≡ s2N−1 ≡ i1i2 . . . i2N−1.
We denote by A0 and A1 the sets of honest strategies
that Alice can use to encode bit values 0 and 1, respec-
tively. According to Subect. III G, a possible strategy
in Ai is a conditional quantum comb {Ai,s2N }, where the
index s2N labels a history of classical information ex-
changed between Alice and Bob. For each history s2N ,
Ai,s2N is a probabilistic comb on Ks2N ⊗ HA,s2N , where
Ks2N = Lin
(⊗2N
j=1Hsj
)
is the Hilbert space of all quan-
tum systems exchanged in the protocol andHA,s2N is the
Hilbert space of Alice’s private ancillae at the last step
of the commitment phase.
We denote by B the set of strategies (honest or not)
that are available to Bob. The set B can be the whole
set of strategies compatible with the communication in-
terface, or a restricted subset. The only assumption here
is that if B contains a strategy, then it contains also its
dilations. The reader should then regard B as a param-
eter of his own choice for the rest of the paper: the im-
possibility proof will state that if the protocol is con-
cealing for a Bob restricted to B, then it is necessarily
not binding for Bob restricted to that subset. An ele-
ment of B is a collection of probabilistic quantum combs
{Bs2N−1}. For each history s2N−1, Bs2N−1 is a comb on
Ks2N−1 ⊗ HB,s2N−1 , where KS2N−1 :=
⊗2N−1
j=0 Hsj , and
HB,s2N−1 is the Hilbert space of Bob’s ancillae at the last
step of the commitment phase. Note that, since Hs0 =
Hs2N = C, one has Ks2N ≃ KS2N−1 ≃
⊗2N−1
j=1 Hsj .
In the following we focus on the last step N before the
opening. Since the step is fixed, we will drop the sub-
index 2N (2N − 1) labeling Alice’s (Bob’s) history. For
the history s, the overall (unnormalized) state resulting
from Alice and Bob playing the strategies {Ai,s′} and
{Bs′}, respectively, is given by the link product
σ(i)s = Bs ∗Ai,s ∈ Lin (HA,s ⊗HB,s) . (56)
The probability of the history s is then given by the trace
p(i)s = Tr[σ
(i)
s ] (57)
The local state at Bob before the opening is
ρ(i)s = TrHA,s [σ
(i)
s ] = Bs ∗Ri,s, (58)
where
Ri,s = TrHA,s [Ai,s] ∈ Lin (Ks) . (59)
is the restriction of Alice’s comb to the quantum systems
exchanged in the protocol.
B. Concealing protocols
Definition 1 (Concealing protocols) A quantum bit
commitment protocol is ε-concealing if there is at least
a couple of honest strategies {A0,s′} ∈ A0, {A1,s′} ∈ A1
such that the following conditions hold:
max
s
∥∥∥ρ(1)s − ρ(0)s ∥∥∥
1
Tr
[
ρ
(1)
s + ρ
(0)
s
] ≤ ε, ∀{Bs′} ∈ B (60)
12
where ρ
(i)
s is the unnormalized state on Bob’s side ρ
(i)
s =
Bs ∗Ri,s, with Ri,s = TrHA,s [Ai,s].
As discussed in subsection III E, the the above condi-
tion means that, for any history of classical communi-
cation, the probability that Bob discriminates correctly
between R0,s and R1,s is ε-close to 1/2, the success prob-
ability of a random guess.
The concealment condition can be translated in terms
of combs distances as follows:
Lemma 3 A protocol is ε-concealing if and only if there
is a couple of honest strategies {A0,s′} and {A1,s′} such
that
max
s
d(R1,s, R0,s)|Ts ≤ ε. (61)
where Ts = {Ts := TrHB,s [Bs], Bs ∈ {Bs′} ∈ B}.
Proof. Clearly, condition (60) holds if an only if
max
s
sup
Bs
‖ρ(1)s − ρ(0)s ‖1
Tr
[
ρ
(1)
s + ρ
(0)
s
] ≤ ε, (62)
where Bs = {Bs ∈ {Bs′} ∈ B}. Moreover, since the
set of Bob’s strategies is closed under dilation, and since
dilation improves the discrimination, the supremum can
be taken over the dilations {B˜s′}. Now, denote by T˜s the
dilation of Ts = TrHB,s [Bs]. Since B˜s and T˜s are both
dilations of Ts, they are connected by a partial isometry
on Bob’s ancillae. The same is true for the states ρ˜
(i)
s :=
B˜s ∗ Ri,s, and ρ(i)Ts := T˜s ∗ Ri,s, for each value i = 0, 1,
whence ‖ρ˜(0)s − ρ˜(1)s ‖1 = ‖ρ(0)Ts − ρ
(1)
Ts
‖1. This implies the
identity
max
s
sup
Bs
∥∥∥ρ(1)s − ρ(0)s ∥∥∥
1
Tr[ρ
(1)
s + ρ
(0)
s ]
= max
s
sup
Bs
∥∥∥ρ˜(1)s − ρ˜(0)s ∥∥∥
1
Tr[ρ˜
(1)
s + ρ˜
(0)
s ]
= max
s
sup
Ts
∥∥∥ρ(1)Ts − ρ(0)Ts ∥∥∥1
Tr[ρ
(1)
Ts
+ ρ
(0)
Ts
]
= max
s
d(R1,s, R0,s)|Ts .
(63)

C. Alice’s cheating strategies
Let {As′} and {A♯s′} be a honest and a dishonest strat-
egy by Alice, respectively (here we drop the index i = 0, 1
of the bit value, since it is unnecessary for the following
discussion). When Bob chooses the strategy {Bs′} ∈ B,
for history s the unnormalized quantum states before the
opening phase are
σs = Bs ∗As, σ♯s = Bs ∗A♯s. (64)
Definition 2 The strategy {A♯s′} is δ-close to the strat-
egy {As′} at the opening if for any strategy {Bs′} ∈ B
one has
max
s
∥∥σs − σ♯s∥∥1
Tr
[
σs + σ
♯
s
] ≤ δ. (65)
If two strategies are δ-close, Bob cannot distinguish be-
tween them, even if the history that takes place is the
most favorable to him.
Following the same argument used in the proof of
lemma 3, the notion of δ-closeness can be expressed in
terms of comb distance as follows:
Lemma 4 The strategy {A♯s′} is δ-close to the strategy
{As′} at the opening if and only if
max
s
d(As, A
♯
s)
∣∣
Ts⊗IA,s
≤ δ, (66)
where Ts ⊗ IA,s = {Ts ⊗ IA,s|Ts = TrHB,s [Bs], Bs ∈
{Bs′} ∈ B} and IA,s denotes the identity on Alice’s an-
cilla HA,s.
Definition 3 Given two honest strategies {A0,s′} ∈ A0
and {A1,s′} ∈ A1, a δ-cheating is a couple of strategies
{A♯0,s′} and {A♯1,s′} satisfying the conditions
1. {A♯i,s′} is δ-close to {Ai,s′} for i = 0, 1
2. for every history s, there exists a quantum channel
Cs acting on Alice’s ancilla space HA,s such that
A♯1,s = (Is ⊗ Cs)(A♯0,s), (67)
where Is is the identity channel on the Hilbert
space Ks of all quantum systems exchanged in the
commitment phase.
The second condition means that Alice can follow the
strategy {A♯0,s′} until the end of the commitment, and
switch to the strategy {A♯1,s} with a local operation on
her ancillae just before the opening.
V. THE IMPOSSIBILITY PROOF
A. Protocols with bounded number of rounds
Theorem 4 If an N -round protocol is ε-concealing with
honest strategies {A0,s} ∈ A0 and {A1,s} ∈ A1, then
there is a
√
2ε-cheating with cheating strategies {A♯0,s}
and {A♯1,s}. In particular, the cheating strategy {A♯0,s}
coincides with the honest strategy {A0,s}.
Proof. According to Eq. (61), the concealing condi-
tion is for any history s
d(R1,s, R0,s)|Ts < ε, (68)
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where Ri,s = TrHA,s [Ai,s] and Ts = {Ts =
TrHB,s [Bs] | Bs ∈ {Bs′} ∈ B}. We now focus on a fixed
history s, and show the existence of two
√
2ε-cheating
strategies {A♯0,s′} and {A♯1,s′}. Since we are fixing s, we
drop the index s everywhere.
Since the reduced combs Ri = TrHA [Ai] ∈ Lin (K) sat-
isfy the condition d(R1, R0)|T < ε, we can use the conti-
nuity of dilation stated by Lemma 2, thus finding a ran-
dom unitary channel P =∑k pkUk acting on the ancilla
space HA ≃ K such that
d(R˜1, (I ⊗ P)R˜0)
∣∣∣
T⊗IA
≤
√
2 d(R1, R0)|T, (69)
where R˜i is the dilation R˜i = |R
1
2
i 〉〉〈〈R
1
2
i | ∈ Lin (K ⊗KA).
Now consider the dilations of the honest strategies
A˜i := |A
1
2
i 〉〉〈〈A
1
2
i |. (70)
Here A˜i is an operator in Lin (K ⊗HA ⊗ LA) where LA ≃
K⊗HA is an additional ancilla space on Alice’s side. By
definition, Ri = TrHA,LA [A˜i]. Since A˜i and R˜i are both
dilations of Ri, there exist a channel Ei sending states on
(HA ⊗ LA) to states on KA such that
R˜i = (IK ⊗ Ei)(A˜i), (71)
and a channel Fi sending states on KA to states on (HA⊗
LA) such that
A˜i = (IK ⊗Fi)(R˜i). (72)
Alice’s cheating procedure is then the following:
• Use the dilated strategy A˜0
• After the commitment decide the bit value. To
commit 0, do nothing. To commit 1, apply the
channel C = F1PE0 on the ancillae, where P(ρ) =∑
i piUiρU
†
i .
• Discard the additional ancilla LA.
This procedure defines for every history s the two cheat-
ing strategies {A♯0,s′} := {A0,s′} and {A1,s′} := {(Is′ ⊗
Cs′)(A
♯
0,s′ )}. Clearly, {A♯0,s′} is
√
2ε-close to {A0,s′} (in
fact, they coincide). Regarding {A♯1,s′}, for any history s
(and hence dropping the index) we have
d(A1, A
♯
1)
∣∣∣
T⊗IA
= d
(
A1,TrLA
[
(I ⊗ F1PE0)(A˜0)
])∣∣∣
T⊗IA
≤ d
(
A˜1, (I ⊗ F1PE0)(A˜0)
)∣∣∣
T⊗IA
= d
(
(I ⊗ F1)(R˜1), (I ⊗ F1P)(R˜0)
)∣∣∣
T⊗IA
≤ d
(
R˜1, (I ⊗ P)(R˜0)
)∣∣∣
T⊗IA
≤
√
2 d(R1, R0)|T ≤
√
2ε.
(73)
Here, the first and the second inequalities derive from
Lemma 1, the third one is Eq. (69), and the last is the
concealing condition. 
B. Protocols with unbounded number or rounds
Here we show how the impossibility result of the previ-
ous subsection can be easily extended to the case of pro-
tocols where the number of rounds is unbounded. In this
case Alice’s (Bob’s) strategies are still described by collec-
tions of probabilistic combs {As′} and ({B′s}), where each
probabilistic comb represents the sequence of quantum
operations performed by Alice (Bob) for a given history
s of classical communication. Note that, although the
length the strings is no longer bounded by a fixed num-
ber, any given string s must have finite length. Indeed,
a protocol allowing an infinitely long history s would be
a protocol in which sometimes Alice and Bob have to
continue their communication forever, without reaching
neither a successful commitment, nor an abort.
For a protocol with unbounded number of rounds, the
conditions of ε-concealment and δ-closeness are still given
by Eqs. (60) and (65), respectively. Now, it is imme-
diate to see that, given an ε-concealing protocol with
unbounded number of rounds, one can always construct
a new ε-concealing protocol with bounded number. In-
deed, Alice can follow the original unbounded protocol,
and decide to abort whenever the number of rounds ex-
ceeds a fixed number N . This change does not change
the security of the protocol: it just reduces the probabil-
ity of successful commitment by turning some histories
that in the original protocol ended in a successful com-
mitment into histories that end in an abort. For the new
protocol with finite rounds, however, one can apply the-
orem 4, thus finding a
√
2ε-cheating for Alice. Since N is
arbitrary and since for any N the cheating strategy co-
incides with the honest one up to the opening, Alice can
take the number N to be sufficiently large to make the
probability of successful commitment close to the one of
the unbounded original protocol.
VI. SUMMARY
In this paper we have provided a new short impos-
sibility proof of quantum bit commitment. The present
proof differs from the previous ones in the following main
aspects: a) The strategies, including all their “purifica-
tions”, have a simple and univocal mathematical repre-
sentation in terms of conditional quantum combs in Eq.
(54); b) The definition of concealment and bindingness
are worst-case over histories, namely the conditions on
cheating probabilities are defined uniformly over histo-
ries of classical communication rather than on average;
c) we consider the possibility of restricting the strate-
gies of Bob to an arbitrary set closed under dilation, and
14
show that if the protocol is concealing for Bob restricted
in this way, then it is not binding. Along similar lines it
is possible to prove the impossibility theorem also with
cheating probabilities averaged over histories. However,
the two impossibility theorems are not comparable, since
worst-case concealment implies concealment in average,
whereas bindingness in average implies worst-case bind-
ingness.
At the end of the paper, we want to stress two points
regarding abortion probabilities. First, concealment is
defined regardless abortion, namely Bob must not be able
to detect the bit value anyway, whether Alice catches him
or not. Second, in order to cheat Alice has only to play
the honest strategy {A0,s′} up to the very last moment
before the opening, at which point her cheat is anyway
undetectable by Bob (at the opening Bob’s success prob-
ability in detecting the cheat is at most
√
2ε-close to the
success probability of a random guess). Therefore, the
probability of abort before the opening is independent
on whether Alice is cheating or not.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF MINIMAX
EQUALITY IN EQ. (45)
Lemma 5 Let f be the function from C× T to R:
f(C, T ) = Re〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,C〉〉 (A1)
〈〈Ψ(1)T,I |Ψ(0)T,C〉〉 =
〈〈R
1
2
1 |T τ ⊗ C|R
1
2
0 〉〉
Tr[T τ (R0 +R1)]
(A2)
where Ri ≥ 0. Then one has the identity
inf
T∈T
′ sup
C∈C
f(C, T ) = sup
C∈C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T ), (A3)
where the infimum over T is taken over the set of tester
operators T ∈ T such that Tr[T τ(R0 +R1)] 6= 0.
Proof. Let T be the closure of the convex hull of T.
Since we are in finite dimensions, T is a compact set.
Define the compact convex set Tn as
Tn :=
{
T ∈ T | Tr[T τ(R0 +R1)] ≥ 1
n
}
. (A4)
We now restrict f to the set Tn and apply Sion’s min-
imax theorem [28]. The hypotheses of the theorem are
satisfied: First, the function is continuous versus C and
T , and both sets C and Tn are compact and convex.
Finally, the function f , being linear-fractional, is quasi-
linear in T for every C [29], whereas it is linear in C for
every T in its domain. For arbitrary n, Sion’s theorem
[28] yields the equality
inf
T∈Tn
sup
C∈C
f(C, T ) = sup
C∈C
inf
T∈Tn
f(C, T ) (A5)
Moreover, the function g(T ) := supC∈C f(C, T ) is quasi-
concave, since it is the supremum over one variable of a
jointly quasi-concave function of (C, T ) [29]. Therefore,
the infimum of g over T is equal to the infimum over the
closed convex hull T, and we have
inf
T∈T
′ sup
C∈C
f(C, T ) = inf
T∈T
′g(T ) = inf
T∈T
′g(T )
= inf
T∈T
′ sup
C∈C
f(C, T ) = inf
n
inf
T∈Tn
sup
C∈C
f(C, T )
= inf
n
sup
C∈C
inf
T∈Tn
f(C, T ) ≥ sup
C∈C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T )
= sup
C∈C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T ),
(A6)
having used that f(C, T ) is quasi-concave in T for any
C, whence the infinum ove T is equal to the infimum
over T. In fact, the above bound is achieved: For any
ε > 0, and for any C ∈ C, there is an element TC ∈ T
such that f(C, TC) ≤ inf ′T∈Tf(C, T ) + ε/2. Moreover,
since f is continuous in its domain, there exist two open
sets AC ⊆ C and BTC ⊆ T such that for C′ ∈ AC and
T ′ ∈ BTC one has f(C′, T ′) ≤ f(C, TC) + ε/2. Now,
the open sets {AC} form an open cover of C. Since C
is compact, one can extract from {AC} a finite subcover
{ACi}. Finally, for any i there is a number ni such that
the intersection between BTCi and Tni is non empty. Let
us define nε = max{ni}. Then we have
sup
C∈ACi
inf
T∈Tnε
f(C, T ) ≤ sup
C∈ACi
inf
T∈Tnε∩BTi
f(C, T )
≤ f(Ci, TCi) + ε/2 ≤ inf
T∈T
′f(Ci, T ) + ε
≤ sup
C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T ) + ε.
(A7)
Since the sets {ACi} cover C, this implies
supC∈C infTnε (f(C, T )) ≤ supC∈C inf ′T∈Tf(C, T ) + ε,
whence
inf
T∈T
′ sup
C∈C
f(C, T ) = inf
n
sup
C∈C
inf
T∈Tn
f(C, T )
≤ sup
C∈C
inf
T∈T
′f(C, T ) + ε.
(A8)

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